Economics · Information Economics and Efficiency Wages
Given below are two statements: Statement I: The Asymmetric Information problem of Moral Hazard arises BEFORE a contract is signed (ex-ante), when one party has private information about its own type (e.g., risk level). Statement II: According to the Efficiency Wage Theory, paying workers above the competitive wage reduces shirking because the cost of job loss (the wage premium) discourages workers from being caught not working. In the light of the above statements, choose the correct answer:
- 1Statement I is true, Statement II is false
- 2Statement I is false, Statement II is true✓
- 3Both statements are false
- 4Both statements are true
Correct answer
Statement I is false, Statement II is true
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